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I performed a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, smfsimple.com a Chinese LLM chatbot, utilizing version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to identify possible security and personal privacy problems.

I have actually composed about DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and privacy issues about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based purely on static analysis. This means that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive proof that all of it is executed in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants analysis, especially given the growing issues around information privacy, monitoring, the possible abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics in between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising issues about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure recognizes these in the iPhone app yesterday too.

• Bespoke file encryption and data obfuscation methods are present, with indications that they might be used to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, rather than counting on the user gadget's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking records detailed user habits without clear approval.
• WebView adjustment exists, which might permit for the app to gain access to private external browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A substantial portion of the examined code appears to concentrate on gathering device-specific details, asteroidsathome.net which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects numerous distinct device identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details.
• System homes, allmy.bio installed plans, and root detection systems suggest potential anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that privacy supporters and security researchers utilize to root their Android gadgets. - Geolocation and network profiling are present, suggesting potential tracking abilities and allowing or disabling of fingerprinting programs by region. - Hardcoded device design lists suggest the application may act differently depending on the spotted hardware. - Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out additional device details. E.g. if it can not determine the device through standard Android SIM lookup (due to the fact that approval was not given), it attempts maker specific extensions to access the very same .
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, a number of observed habits line up with recognized spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app uses reflection and UI overlays, which could help with unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, serial numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for unknown purposes.
• The app carries out country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, suggesting possible security systems.
• The app implements calls to load Dex modules, where extra code is loaded from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves reverse and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be used to fill additional.so files. This facility is not normally inspected by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
• The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. The use of native code adds a layer of intricacy to the analysis procedure and obscures the full extent of the app's abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily intensify privileges, potentially making use of vulnerabilities within the os or gadget hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While information collection prevails in modern applications for debugging and fishtanklive.wiki enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises significant personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a valid email, links.gtanet.com.br which must already provide sufficient authentication. There is no legitimate factor for the app to strongly gather and send unique gadget identifiers, IMEI numbers, disgaeawiki.info SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
  
  The extent of tracking observed here exceeds common analytics practices, potentially enabling relentless user tracking and re-identification throughout gadgets. These habits, integrated with obfuscation methods and network interaction with third-party tracking services, warrant a greater level of scrutiny from security scientists and users alike.
  
  The employment of runtime code loading in addition to the bundling of native code suggests that the app might allow the implementation and execution of unreviewed, from another location provided code. This is a serious prospective attack vector. No evidence in this report is presented that from another location released code execution is being done, only that the center for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's method to discovering rooted gadgets appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is frequently warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material protection are critical, or in competitive computer game to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for such stringent measures in an application of this nature, raising additional questions about its intent.
  
  Users and organizations thinking about installing DeepSeek must understand these potential dangers. If this application is being used within a business or federal government environment, extra vetting and security controls must be imposed before permitting its deployment on managed devices.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based upon static code evaluation and does not imply that all spotted functions are actively used. Further investigation is required for definitive conclusions.