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I performed a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to recognize possible security and privacy issues.

I've written about DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and privacy concerns about DeepSeek have been raised.

See also this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on static analysis. This implies that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive proof that all of it is carried out in practice. Nonetheless, the existence of such code warrants examination, especially offered the growing issues around data personal privacy, monitoring, disgaeawiki.info the possible abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage characteristics between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising concerns about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure recognizes these in the iPhone app yesterday also.

• Bespoke file encryption and information obfuscation methods are present, with indicators that they might be utilized to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, users.atw.hu instead of depending on the user gadget's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking catches detailed user behavior without clear permission.
• WebView control is present, which might permit the app to gain access to personal external browser data when links are opened. More details about WebView controls is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A substantial part of the analyzed code appears to concentrate on event device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app gathers various special device identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details.
• System homes, installed plans, and root detection systems recommend steps. E.g. probes for the existence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security researchers utilize to root their Android devices.
• Geolocation and network profiling are present, showing prospective tracking abilities and making it possible for or disabling of fingerprinting regimes by area.
• Hardcoded device design lists recommend the application might act differently depending on the found hardware.
• Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out extra gadget details. E.g. if it can not identify the gadget through basic Android SIM lookup (since permission was not approved), it tries manufacturer particular extensions to access the exact same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, numerous observed habits align with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, garagesale.es which might facilitate unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, serial numbers, raovatonline.org and funsilo.date other device-specific data are aggregated for unknown functions.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, suggesting possible monitoring systems.
• The app executes calls to pack Dex modules, where additional code is packed from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves reverse and make additional calls to dlopen(), hb9lc.org which can be utilized to load additional.so files. This center is not generally inspected by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be implemented in native code, such as C++. Using native code adds a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the full extent of the app's abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more quickly intensify advantages, possibly making use of vulnerabilities within the operating system or gadget hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While information collection prevails in modern-day applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises considerable personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to log in with a valid email, which must already offer sufficient authentication. There is no legitimate factor for the app to strongly gather and transfer unique device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system homes.
  
  The level of tracking observed here surpasses normal analytics practices, possibly making it possible for persistent user tracking and re-identification throughout devices. These habits, combined with obfuscation strategies and network communication with third-party tracking services, call for a greater level of analysis from security scientists and users alike.
  
  The employment of runtime code packing in addition to the bundling of native code suggests that the app might allow the implementation and execution of unreviewed, from another location provided code. This is a major prospective attack vector. No evidence in this report is presented that remotely released code execution is being done, just that the center for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's technique to discovering rooted devices appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is often justified in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content defense are crucial, or in competitive computer game to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear reasoning for such strict procedures in an application of this nature, raising further questions about its intent.
  
  Users and organizations thinking about setting up DeepSeek must understand these prospective risks. If this application is being used within a business or government environment, extra vetting and security controls must be enforced before enabling its implementation on handled gadgets.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis provided in this report is based on fixed code review and does not imply that all identified functions are actively utilized. Further investigation is required for definitive conclusions.