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I performed a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using variation 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to recognize potential security and personal privacy concerns.

I've about DeepSeek previously here.

Additional security and privacy issues about DeepSeek have been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based purely on fixed analysis. This suggests that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive evidence that all of it is carried out in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants scrutiny, especially given the growing issues around data personal privacy, surveillance, the potential misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising issues about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure identifies these in the iPhone app the other day too.

• Bespoke encryption and information obfuscation methods exist, with indications that they could be utilized to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, instead of counting on the user gadget's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking catches detailed user behavior without clear permission. - WebView control exists, which could permit the app to gain access to private external browser data when links are opened. More details about WebView adjustments is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A considerable part of the examined code appears to concentrate on event device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects numerous special device identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System properties, set up packages, and root detection systems suggest prospective anti-tampering steps. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that privacy advocates and security scientists use to root their Android gadgets.
• Geolocation and network profiling are present, showing prospective tracking capabilities and allowing or disabling of fingerprinting routines by area. - Hardcoded device design lists recommend the application might behave in a different way depending upon the detected hardware.
• Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out extra gadget details. E.g. if it can not identify the device through standard Android SIM lookup (because consent was not given), it tries manufacturer specific extensions to access the very same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without dynamic analysis, numerous observed behaviors align with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app uses reflection and UI overlays, systemcheck-wiki.de which might assist in unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, identification numbers, surgiteams.com and other device-specific information are aggregated for unidentified purposes.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, suggesting possible monitoring mechanisms.
• The app carries out calls to fill Dex modules, where additional code is packed from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves reverse and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to fill additional.so files. This center is not usually checked by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. Making use of native code includes a layer of intricacy to the analysis procedure and forum.batman.gainedge.org obscures the full degree of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily escalate advantages, potentially making use of vulnerabilities within the operating system or gadget hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While information collection prevails in modern-day applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises significant privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to visit with a valid email, which ought to already offer enough authentication. There is no valid reason for the app to aggressively gather and transfer distinct device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
  
  The degree of tracking observed here goes beyond typical analytics practices, possibly making it possible for forum.altaycoins.com consistent user tracking and re-identification across gadgets. These habits, integrated with obfuscation methods and network communication with third-party tracking services, necessitate a greater level of analysis from security researchers and users alike.
  
  The work of runtime code packing along with the bundling of native code recommends that the app might permit the deployment and execution of unreviewed, funsilo.date from another location provided code. This is a major potential attack vector. No evidence in this report is provided that remotely deployed code execution is being done, just that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's method to finding rooted gadgets appears excessive for disgaeawiki.info an AI chatbot. Root detection is typically warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material defense are vital, or in competitive computer game to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear reasoning for such strict measures in an application of this nature, raising additional concerns about its intent.
  
  Users and organizations considering installing DeepSeek needs to understand these potential dangers. If this application is being utilized within a business or federal government environment, additional vetting and security controls must be enforced before permitting its deployment on handled devices.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis provided in this report is based upon fixed code review and does not suggest that all identified functions are actively used. Further investigation is needed for definitive conclusions.