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I carried out a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, users.atw.hu a Chinese LLM chatbot, utilizing variation 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to recognize possible security and privacy concerns.

I have actually written about DeepSeek previously here.

Additional security and privacy issues about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See also this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based purely on fixed analysis. This indicates that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive evidence that all of it is executed in practice. Nonetheless, the existence of such code warrants examination, particularly offered the growing concerns around data privacy, monitoring, the potential abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage characteristics in between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, users.atw.hu raising issues about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app yesterday too. - Bespoke file encryption and information obfuscation approaches are present, with signs that they might be utilized to exfiltrate user details.

• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, rather than depending on the user device's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking catches detailed user habits without clear permission. - WebView manipulation is present, which could permit the app to gain access to personal external internet browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A significant portion of the examined code appears to focus on event device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects various identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System residential or commercial properties, set up plans, and root detection mechanisms suggest possible anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for the existence of Magisk, a tool that privacy supporters and security scientists utilize to root their Android devices. - Geolocation and network profiling exist, suggesting prospective tracking abilities and allowing or disabling of fingerprinting routines by region. - Hardcoded device design lists recommend the application may act differently depending upon the detected hardware.
• Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out additional device details. E.g. if it can not determine the device through basic Android SIM lookup (since consent was not granted), it tries manufacturer particular extensions to access the exact same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without dynamic analysis, numerous observed behaviors align with recognized spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which might assist in unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, identification numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for unknown functions.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible surveillance mechanisms.
• The app implements calls to load Dex modules, where additional code is loaded from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so submits themselves reverse and make extra calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to fill additional.so files. This facility is not usually examined by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
• The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. Using native code includes a layer of intricacy to the analysis procedure and obscures the full degree of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more quickly intensify advantages, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities within the os or gadget hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While information collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises substantial privacy issues. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a valid email, which ought to currently offer adequate authentication. There is no legitimate factor for asteroidsathome.net the app to strongly gather and transmit special gadget identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
  
  The extent of tracking observed here exceeds normal analytics practices, potentially making it possible for consistent user tracking and re-identification across devices. These behaviors, integrated with obfuscation techniques and network communication with third-party tracking services, warrant a higher level of scrutiny from security researchers and users alike.
  
  The employment of runtime code loading in addition to the bundling of native code recommends that the app might enable the deployment and execution of unreviewed, from another location delivered code. This is a serious possible attack vector. No evidence in this report is presented that remotely released code execution is being done, just that the center for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's method to identifying rooted devices appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is frequently warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content protection are important, or in competitive computer game to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for such rigorous measures in an application of this nature, raising additional questions about its intent.
  
  Users and companies thinking about setting up DeepSeek ought to understand these prospective risks. If this application is being used within a business or forum.pinoo.com.tr government environment, additional vetting and security controls should be implemented before enabling its deployment on handled gadgets.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based on static code evaluation and does not indicate that all identified functions are actively utilized. Further examination is required for conclusive conclusions.