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I carried out a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, utilizing version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to determine prospective security and privacy problems.

I've discussed DeepSeek previously here.

Additional security and privacy concerns about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on static analysis. This suggests that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive evidence that all of it is performed in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants examination, particularly given the growing issues around data personal privacy, surveillance, the prospective misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage characteristics in between worldwide powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising issues about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app the other day also. - Bespoke encryption and data obfuscation techniques are present, with indicators that they could be utilized to exfiltrate user details.

• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, instead of depending on the user gadget's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking catches detailed user behavior without clear consent. - WebView control exists, which could permit the app to gain access to private external web browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A substantial portion of the analyzed code appears to focus on event device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app gathers numerous unique device identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System residential or commercial properties, installed plans, and root detection mechanisms recommend possible anti-tampering steps. E.g. probes for library.kemu.ac.ke the presence of Magisk, setiathome.berkeley.edu a tool that privacy supporters and security scientists use to root their Android devices.
• Geolocation and network profiling are present, showing prospective tracking capabilities and enabling or disabling of fingerprinting regimes by region.
• Hardcoded device model lists suggest the application might act differently depending upon the detected hardware. - Multiple vendor-specific services are used to extract additional device details. E.g. if it can not figure out the device through standard Android SIM lookup (because authorization was not given), it tries maker particular extensions to access the same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without analysis, several observed habits align with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which might help with unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, identification numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for unknown functions.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible surveillance systems.
• The app carries out calls to fill Dex modules, where additional code is filled from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves reverse and make extra calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to fill additional.so files. This facility is not normally inspected by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
• The.so files can be implemented in native code, such as C++. Using native code includes a layer of complexity to the analysis process and obscures the full extent of the app's abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily intensify privileges, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities within the os or photorum.eclat-mauve.fr gadget hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While data collection prevails in modern-day applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises significant personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to visit with a valid email, which need to currently supply sufficient authentication. There is no valid reason for the app to strongly gather and transmit distinct device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
  
  The level of tracking observed here exceeds normal analytics practices, potentially allowing persistent user tracking and re-identification across gadgets. These habits, integrated with obfuscation techniques and yewiki.org network communication with third-party tracking services, require a higher level of examination from security researchers and users alike.
  
  The work of runtime code packing in addition to the bundling of native code suggests that the app could permit the release and execution of unreviewed, remotely provided code. This is a severe possible attack vector. No proof in this report exists that remotely deployed code execution is being done, just that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's method to detecting rooted devices appears excessive for an AI chatbot. Root detection is often justified in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content protection are crucial, or in competitive video games to prevent unfaithful. However, macphersonwiki.mywikis.wiki there is no clear rationale for such stringent procedures in an application of this nature, raising more concerns about its intent.
  
  Users and companies thinking about installing DeepSeek ought to be mindful of these potential dangers. If this application is being utilized within an enterprise or opensourcebridge.science government environment, additional vetting and security controls must be enforced before permitting its deployment on handled devices.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based on fixed code evaluation and does not suggest that all identified functions are actively utilized. Further examination is required for conclusive conclusions.